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Grandparents Raising Grandchildren in Illinois-
Establishing the Right to a Continuing Relationship
Through Visitation, Custody, and Guardianship in
2007: Where We've Been, Where We Are, and
Where We Need to Go
by Rebecca J. O'Neill*
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's society, many grandparents are very involved in their
grandchildren's lives and play a vital role in meeting their
grandchildren's day-to-day living needs. Often grandparents assume
the responsibilities of parenting for their grandchildren. In Illinois,
there are 288,827 children living in households headed by persons other
than their parents.' Of these, approximately 213,465 live with
grandparents. 2  Over one quarter of the grandparents raising
grandchildren in Illinois report that they live in households without the
children's parents present. 3 As of 2000, approximately forty percent of
Illinois households list grandparents as primary caregivers for children. 4
In meeting these children's essential living needs, the grandparents
often form substantial relationships with the children.
Whether grandparents have a legal right to secure and protect the
relationships they form with their grandchildren has become
* Rebecca J. O'Neill is a Clinical Professor at Southern Illinois University School of Law where
she teaches and supervises law students who provide legal services to elderly persons in the
southern thirteen counties of Illinois. Rebecca has provided legal representation to many
grandparents in custody, visitation, adoption, and guardianship cases. She has also spoken to
numerous grandparents about the legal issues grandparents confront throughout southern Illinois.
1. AARP, ILLINOIS: A STATE FACT SHEET FOR GRANDPARENT AND OTHER RELATIVES
RAISING CHILDREN 1 (2005), http://www.giclocalsupport.org/doc/kinship-care 2006il.pdf.
2. Id. This number equals 6.67% of all children in the state. Id.
3. Id. (These data were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau Table DP-2. Profile Selected
Social Characteristics: 2000.) Approximately 104,000 grandparents in Illinois reported they were
responsible for their grandchildren living with them. Id.
4. Michael K. Goldberg, Can Court-Imposed Grandparent Visitation Survive Wickham v.
Byrne?, 90 ILL. B.J. 458, 458 (2002).
734 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 38
questionable in the wake of two seminal decisions: Troxel v. Granville 5
and Wickham v. Byrne.6 These decisions have played an important role
in defining the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes-the
state statutes that set forth when and under what circumstances
grandparents may petition for visitation. It is currently unresolved
whether the Illinois statutes can be interpreted in a manner that will
justify a court's grant of grandparent visitation without violating the
parents' rights to make decisions concerning their child.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court in Wickham v. Byrne declared
the Illinois grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional, grandparents
have not given up the pursuit to secure and protect their relationships
with their grandchildren. Many grandparents have continued to file
cases seeking the right to maintain relationships with their
grandchildren through guardianship, custody, visitation, and adoption
proceedings. 7 Since Wickham, the Illinois Supreme Court has revisited
the legal issues involving parental rights, and interference with those
rights by grandparents and others. The court has done this in the
context of cases involving grandparent visitation, 8 the Juvenile Court
Act,9 the Parentage Act,10 and guardianship under the Probate Act.11
The court's ruling in Wickham has also, in part, prompted a proliferation
of challenges in the appellate courts. Although many cases clearly
warrant court protection of the grandparent-grandchild relationship, the
5. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held
that a Washington statute providing that any person may petition the court for visitation at any
time was unconstitutional because the statute was too broad. Id. at 73. The Court found that the
statute violated the parent's due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of her children. Id. at 75
6. Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002). In this case the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that a state statute authorizing grandparent visitation was unconstitutional as applied to fit
parents. Id. at 10.
7. At the time this article was written, approximately thirty Illinois cases that cite Wickham
have been reported by the Illinois appellate courts. These cases address grandparents and other
parties who seek the right to protect some type of relationship with a child.
8. See In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392 (111. 2004) (holding that agreed grandparent visitation
orders are not unconstitutional).
9. See In re Austin W., 823 N.E.2d 572, 584 (Ill. 2005) ("Even the superior right of a natural
parent must yield unless it is in accord with the best interests of the child. Under certain
circumstances 'it is not necessary that the natural parent be found unfit or be found to have legally
forfeited his rights to custody, if it is in the best interest of the child that he be placed in the
custody of someone other than the natural parent."') (quoting People ex rel. Edwards v.
Livingston, 247 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. 1969)).
10. See In re the Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. 2004) (holding that the trial court
could not find the Parentage Act unconstitutional as applied without holding an evidentiary
hearing, and finding that the Parentage Act is not facially unconstitutional).
11. See In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22, 27-28 (Ill. 2006) (discussing the standing requirements
under the Probate Act in a case involving a guardianship petition).
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courts have struggled with how to apply the broad Wickham ruling.
Specifically, a review of appellate court decisions since Wickham
indicates a conflict among the appellate courts regarding the burden of
proof a grandparent must meet to make a claim for court protection of
the grandparent-grandchild relationship. Consequently, the law is being
applied inconsistently in Illinois.
Specifically, courts have struggled to set applicable legal standards in
these cases, and they have not been uniform in analyzing grandparent
visitation, custody, and guardianship cases. Courts are now holding that
standing requirements are contingent upon whether a petitioner seeks
relief under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the
Probate Act, or the Juvenile Court Act. 12  Application of different
standing requirements is problematic because under each statute the
petitioner seeks to establish a legal right to some form of relationship
with a child and to interfere with the parent's right to make decisions
concerning the child's care-a right which the courts have deemed
fundamental.
The Illinois legislature has responded to the court decisions
concerning grandparent visitation rights by revising the visitation
statute 13 three times since Wickham. The newest amendment became
effective January 1, 2007. In considering these amendments, this article
has four principal aims. First, it will explain the amendments to the
statute and how the statute should be reviewed when it is challenged
constitutionally. Second, this article contends that the legislature must
revise both the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
provisions concerning grandparent visitation and custody and the
guardianship provisions of the Probate Act. Third, this article suggests
that the Illinois Supreme Court wrongly decided Wickham by broadly
holding section 607(b)(1) of the grandparent visitation statute
unconstitutional, because there are identifiable circumstances in which
the statute would have survived constitutional scrutiny. Fourth, this
article argues that the state may often have a compelling interest in
protecting the relationship between a child and his or her nonparental
caregiver when a substantial relationship between the two has formed,
and will also discuss other circumstances that would warrant state
protection of the grandparent-grandchild relationship.
12. See id. (discussing the standing requirements under the Probate Act); In re Austin W., 823
N.E.2d at 580 (discussing the standing requirements under the Juvenile Court Act); In re Custody
of T.W., 851 N.E.2d 881, 884-85 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (discussing the standing requirements
under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act). See also infra Part Il.D (further
discussing the standing requirements under these three acts).
13. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2006).
2007]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Although black letter rules are difficult to establish in family law
cases given the nature of the factual variances that are presented before
the courts, the state needs a clearer, more uniform standing requirement
in cases involving grandparents who seek the right to protect
relationships with their grandchildren. All parties involved in
grandparent cases, and the attorneys who represent them, need
assurance that the law will be applied consistently whether the
petitioner seeks visitation, custody, or guardianship of the minor child.
By giving the reader a comprehensive review of the recent inconsistent
cases involving grandparents who have sought to secure relationships
with their grandchildren through the courts, this article argues that the
legislature must create uniform laws involving grandparent visitation,
custody, and guardianship. These laws can, and should, be written in a
manner that will clearly withstand constitutional scrutiny.
II. THRESHOLD ISSUES
Several threshold issues must be addressed before a court can render
a decision concerning a child. Does the court have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case? Do the statutes require that notice or service
of process be made in a particular manner for the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the parties? Is the court the appropriate venue for the
case? What gives a person who is not the biological parent of the child
standing to bring the case to the court? This part addresses these issues
and their relevance to grandparent child visitation cases.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
"Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to hear
and determine cases." 1 4 The Second District Appellate Court in Felzak
v. Hruby recently confronted some of the significant subject matter
jurisdiction issues that can arise in grandparent visitation cases. 15 In
Felzak, the parents were held in indirect civil contempt of court for
failing to allow grandparent visitation as ordered in 1995. The parents
argued that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the grandparents' claim because the visitation statute on which it was
based had been declared unconstitutional. 16 As a result, the parents
argued, the court order holding them in contempt was invalid. 17
14. Felzak v. Hruby, 855 N.E.2d 202, 214 (I11. App. Ct. 2006) (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 188 (I11. 2002)).
15. Felzak, 855 N.E.2d at 202.
16. ld.at210-11.
17. Id.
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The parents' argument relied on a recent Fifth District opinion, In Re
Dobbs,18 which determined that a trial court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to enter an agreed visitation order concerning an adult when
the statute on which it was based contained no provisions for adult
visitation. 19 The parents further argued that In Re M.M.D., a case
upholding a voluntary visitation agreement, did not address the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, 20 and even if there was subject matter
jurisdiction, the visitation order was void for lack of consideration. 21
The trial court denied the parents' motion to dismiss, relying upon the
Illinois Supreme Court decision, In re M.M.D.,22 which held that agreed
orders for grandparent visitation were not void as unconstitutional and
should be enforced.23 The Second District Court agreed that In Re
M.M.D. did not resolve the jurisdictional issues in this case, but the
court refused to apply Dobbs. The court stated, "In M.M.D., our
supreme court did not consider whether the trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction over disputes concerning grandparent visitation, but
whether a provision of a consent decree allowing grandparent visitation
was void as unconstitutional. ' 24 The court noted that in M.M.D., the
court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter an agreed order under the
Illinois Probate Act and the Illinois Parentage Act, because the cases
were brought under these acts. 25 Therefore, neither case answered the
question of whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over an
action for grandparent visitation brought under the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act.
26
In Felzak, the only action that had been filed was a petition for
grandparent visitation under the grandparent visitation statute.
Therefore, the court was forced to consider whether standing still
existed since section 607(b) had become inoperative. The court
acknowledged that a judgment is void if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter before it.27 The court found, however, that
the trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the
18. Id. at 209 (citing In Re Marriage of Dobbs, 831 N.E.2d 1154 (1l. App. Ct. 2005)).
19. In Re Marriage of Dobbs, 831 N.E.2d at 1158. In this case, a father brought an action
against his former wife to allow visitation with their disabled adult child. Id. at 1155.
20. Felzak, 855 N.E.2d at 212.
21. Id. at 210.
22. In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392 (111. 2004).
23. Felzak, 855 N.E.2d at 209 (citing In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392).
24. Id. at 212 (citing In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392).
25. Id. at 213.
26. See id.
27. Id. (citing Diaz v. Provena Hosps., 817 N.E.2d 206, 213 (ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
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visitation order under common law, noting that the court's equitable
powers over grandparent visitation "existed at common law prior to and
independent of the enactment of section 607(b). ' ' 28  "As a result,
grandparent visitation was not a justiciable matter created by the
legislature, and therefore it did not disappear when section 607(b)
became inoperative." 29  The court noted that several post-Wickham
cases had refused to apply the common law because the special-
circumstances test applied the best-interests standard. 30  While
acknowledging that the Wickham decision removed the earlier common
law doctrine that grandparent visitation could be granted under special
circumstances, the court found that Wickham did not eliminate
grandparent visitation as a justiciable matter. 31 Therefore, the court
found that the consent decree entered into by the parents was not void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 32 At the time, the then-newly
revised grandparent visitation statute3 3 had not yet been ruled
unconstitutional. Therefore, standing under this new statute was not
addressed by the court in Felzak.
In cases involving grandparents or de facto parents seeking visitation,
guardianship, or custody, the court's subject matter jurisdiction depends
upon whether the grandparents or de facto parents seek relief under a
statute. If no statute exists to support the relief sought, then the court
must determine whether a justiciable matter exists under common law.
The appellate courts in Illinois have issued conflicting opinions
concerning the survival of common law since the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling in Wickham.34
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
Before addressing the merits of any petition concerning a child's
welfare-whether the case involves guardianship, adoption, child
custody, or visitation-a court must first address the issue of personal
jurisdiction over the child and parties. The court should consider
whether the applicable statute has specific jurisdictional requirements
28. Id. at 215.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Ross, 824 N.E.2d 1108, 1115-17 (11l. App. Ct. 2005),
Beurksen v. Graff, 813 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (LI. App. Ct. 2004); Langman v. Langman, 757
N.E.2d 505, 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)). When a court applies a best-interests standard, the court
considers several factors, such as the mental and physical health of those involved, the wishes of
the child, the child's adjustment to home, school, and community.
31. Felzak, 855 N.E.2d at 216.
32. Id. at 219-20.
33. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b) (2006).
34. See infra Part II.C (fully discussing the conflicting opinions issued after Wickham).
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and whether any other statute would control the jurisdictional question.
In particular, in cases involving children who have been removed from
the state, or who have recently moved to the state, the court must
consider the application of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act,35 the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,36
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 37 and possibly the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction. 38
The jurisdiction and venue requirements for cases involving child
custody or grandparent visitation are found within the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act.39 When cases for custody or visitation are
filed by someone other than a parent, the petition must be filed in the
county where the child is permanently a resident or found, but only if
the child is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. 40 Notice of
a child-custody or visitation proceeding must be provided to the child's
parents, guardian, and custodian. 41  Notice requires that the child's
parent, guardian, and custodian be served written notice and a copy of
the petition to modify at least thirty days prior to the hearing on the
petition.42 The Act is silent about the necessity of service and notice to
the child involved in a custody or visitation proceeding.
In contrast, the Probate Act does not specify that personal service of
process must be made on a minor child or the child's parents for a court
to exercise in personam jurisdiction when a petition for guardianship
over a minor has been filed. Instead the Act states:
Unless excused by the court for good cause shown, it is the duty of the
petitioner to give notice of the time and place of the hearing on the
petition, in person or by mail, to the minor, if the minor is 14 years, or
older, and to the relatives of the minor whose names and addresses are
stated in the petition, not less than 3 days before the hearing, but
failure to give notice to any relative is not jurisdictional. 43
35. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 36/102 (2006).
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West 2006).
37. 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/1 (2006).
38. This was adopted by the Hague Convention in 1980 to attempt to combat the problem of
international parental child abduction. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98.
39. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a-3), (a-5), (4) (2006).
40. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2) (2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a-3) (2004),
amended by 2006 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 94-1026 (H.B. 4357) (West) (stating when persons other
than parents may file a petition for custody or visitation).
41. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(c) (2004).
42. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(d) (2004).
43. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-10.1 (2004).
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Compare the statutory jurisdictional requirements of guardianship,
custody, and visitation to those in the Adoption Statute, which requires
that summons be served on a minor child who is the subject of an
adoption.44  In guardianship, custody, and grandparent visitation cases,
a court can exercise jurisdiction over a child even without the personal
service of process upon the child's parent. Notice to parents may be
made by publication if other means of notice are not effective. 45 These
threshold issues of jurisdiction, venue, and standing must be resolved
before proceeding to look more thoroughly at grandparent visitation. If
a grandparent can establish subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and proper venue, she may then seek visitation based on the
merits of her claim.
III. GRANDPARENT VISITATION
The issue of grandparent visitation in Illinois is largely controlled by
the Illinois grandparent visitation statute, which was initially adopted in
198 1.46 Previously, grandparent visitation rights were controlled by
common law, which allowed a grandparent visitation rights upon a
showing of special circumstances. 47 The statute has subsequently been
44. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/7.A. (2004).
45. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 36/108 (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-203, 2-206, 2-208 (2004)
(authorizing publication if person outside of the state and no other manner is reasonable).
46. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, 607(b), amended by Act of Sept. 2, 1981, Pub. Act. 82-344,
1981 Ill. Laws 1856. This statute provided the "court may grant reasonable visitation privileges
to a grandparent or great-grandparent of any minor child upon the grandparents' or great-
grandparents' petition to the court ... if the court determines that it is in the best interest and
welfare of the child." Id.
The Illinois Probate Act also has provisions allowing visitation rights for grandparents and other
relatives when both natural or adoptive parents of a minor are deceased. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-7.1 (2004). The Act allows courts to grant reasonable visitation when found to be in the best
interests of the child. The Act states:
Whenever both natural or adoptive parents of a minor are deceased, visitation rights
shall be granted to the grandparents of the minor who are the parents of the minor's
legal parents unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the best
interests and welfare of the minor. In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation
rights may be granted to any other relative of the minor or other person having an
interest in the welfare of the child. However, the court shall not grant visitation
privileges to any person who otherwise might have visitation privileges under this
Section where the minor has been adopted subsequent to the death of both of his legal
parents except where such adoption is by a close relative ....
Where such adoption is by a close relative, the court shall not grant visitation
privileges under this Section unless the petitioner alleges and proves that he or she has
been unreasonably denied visitation with the child. The court may grant reasonable
visitation privileges upon finding that such visitation would be in the best interest of
the child.
Id.
47. See Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ill. 1976) ("[T]he giving of the visitation
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amended several times.48  When adopting the grandparent visitation
statute, the Illinois legislature codified the common law decisions to
form the statute's substantive provisions.
A. Wickham v. Byrne
In 2002, in Wickham v. Byrne,49 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled the
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional. 50 The court consolidated
rights to the grandfather over the objections of the mother in the absence of any special
circumstances justifying the interference with the superior custodial right of the natural parent [is]
error."). See also infra Part mfl.C (discussing common law standards).
48. See Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 526-29 (I11. 2000) (discussing the history of the
grandparent visitation statute).
In September of 1985 the General Assembly amended the statute adding that the court "may grant
reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or great-grandparent whose child has died where
the court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983,
ch. 40, 607(b) (as amended by Public Act 82-1002, eff. September 17, 1982). Also in 1985, the
General Assembly added to the language of Section 607 to permit grandparent visitation
following adoption of the minor by the spouse of the custodial parent after either death or
termination of parental rights of the other parent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, 607(b) (as
amended by Public Act 84-667, eff. September 20, 1985).
The grandparent visitation statute was next amended in 1989, this time allowing grandparents the
right to seek visitation regardless of whether the nuclear family was still intact. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989, ch. 40, 607(b)(1)(A) (as amended by Public Act 86-855, eff. September 8, 1989). Finally,
in 1991, the grandparent visitation statute was amended again, putting it in the form that was
ultimately interpreted in the Lulay decision. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, 607(b)(1) (as amended
by Public Act 86-1452, eff. July 1, 1991).
49. Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1 (I1. 2002).
50. Id. at 7-8. The visitation statute provided:
(b)(1) The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent, great-
grandparent, or sibling of any minor child upon petition to the court by the
grandparents or great-grandparents or on behalf of a sibling, with notice to the parties
required to be notified under Section 601 of this Act, if the court determines that it is in
the best interests and welfare of the child, and may issue any necessary orders to
enforce such visitation privileges. Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection (b), a petition for visitation privileges may be filed under this paragraph (1)
whether or not a petition pursuant to this Act has been previously filed or is currently
pending if one ore more of the following circumstances exist:
(A) the parents are not currently cohabiting on a permanent or an indefinite basis;
(B) one of the parents has been absent from the marital abode for more than one month
without the spouse knowing his or her whereabouts;
(C) one of the parents is deceased;
(D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the grandparents, great-grandparents, or
sibling; or
(E) a sibling is in State custody.
(3) When one parent is deceased, the surviving parent shall not interfere with the
visitation rights of the grandparents.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(b)(1) and (3) (West 2002) invalidated by Wickham, 769
N.E.2d 1.
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two cases when considering whether certain provisions of the
grandparent visitation statute violated a parent's due process rights. 51 In
the first case, the mother of the minor child had died. In her last will
and testament the mother had expressed her wish for frequent visitation
between her mother (the child's grandmother) and the child.52 After the
child's mother's death, the father honored the mother's request and
allowed the grandmother to visit with the grandchild.53 However, the
father refused to allow the grandmother unsupervised and overnight
visitation. The grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation.
54
The father filed a motion to dismiss the petition, claiming that the
grandparent visitation statute violated his due process rights. He based
his argument on the decisions of the United State Supreme Court in
Troxel v. Granville55 and the Illinois Supreme Court in Lulay v. Lulay.56
In the second consolidated case, the grandparents of the minor
children involved had maintained a close relationship with their
grandchildren, seeing them two to three times a month.57  The
grandparents' son, the father of the children, died.58 Following their
son's death, the grandparents continued their relationship with the
grandchildren, seeing the grandchildren once a week.59  The
grandparents requested more time with the grandchildren, but the
mother refused. 60  After the grandparents filed their petition for
visitation, the mother moved the children six hours away from the
grandparents to make a fresh start.61
In both cases, the trial courts granted some form of visitation to the
grandparents. 62 In the first case, the trial court found that the state may
51. Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
56. Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521 (I1. 2000). In this case both parents objected to the
grandparent's petition for visitation with her grandchildren. The Illinois Supreme Court found
that the state did not have a compelling state interest to maintain a relationship between the
grandparent and grandchildren where the children's parents were divorced yet stood united in
their parental decision that children should not visit with the grandparent, and, therefore, Section
607(b)(1) of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act could not pass the strict-scrutiny test.
The court held that Section 607(b)(1), as applied to this case, was an unconstitutional
infringement on the parents' fundamental liberty interest in raising their children.
57. Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2-3.
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have had a compelling interest in ordering visitation between the child
and grandchild over the parent's objection. 63 The parent applied for an
interlocutory appeal from this decision under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 308.64 The appellate court denied the appeal, but the Illinois
Supreme Court granted it. In the second case, the trial court said:
It has been the law of Illinois for over 30 years that when considering
the best interest of the children the Court must look at "all matters that
have a bearing upon the welfare of the child. .... " [T]here is a strong
indication that unsupervised grandparental visitation would be of great
benefit to the children. Their father is deceased, his surviving family
is the only connection the children can have with those who had an
intimate and close family relationship.65
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that
section 607(b)(1), as applied in this case, unconstitutionally infringed on
the mother's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of her children. 66
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that section 607(b)(1)
contained a flaw similar to the statute at issue in Troxel.67 The Court
concluded that it "could conceive of no set of circumstances under
which section 607(b)(1) [and section 607(b)(3)] of the Act would be
valid," and held these sections facially unconstitutional. 68
Following this opinion, several cases challenged prior orders that had
granted grandparent visitation rights. These cases, which are discussed
in the next section, address whether prior consent decrees are still
enforceable, and whether the common law survives, in light of
Wickham's ruling finding the grandparent visitation statute
unconstitutional.69
63. Id.
64. This rule permits immediate appeal of an order where doing so may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 308.
65. Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 4.
66. Id.
67.
Like the statute in Troxel, section 607(b)(1), in every case, places the parent on equal
footing with the party seeking visitation rights. Further, like the statute in Troxel,
section 607(b)(1) directly contravenes the traditional presumption that parents are fit
and act in the best interests of their children. The statute allows the "State to infringe
on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a
state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made."
Id. at 7-8 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
68. Id. at 8.
69. See infra Part tlI.C (discussing the appellate split over whether the statute being declared
unconstitutional made the common law rule unconstitutional as well).
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B. Consent Decrees
Wickham did not resolve the issue of enforcing prior grandparent
visitation orders. The legal challenge to prior orders was based upon
the premise that visitation orders were void as a result of the decision in
Wickham. One could argue that because the agreement was entered
with knowledge of the grandparent visitation statute, the agreement was
invalid because it would not have been made absent the statute. The
Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of enforcement of consent
orders in In re M.M.D.7
0
In re M.M.D. dealt with an agreement between the father of a minor
child and the child's grandparents setting forth the grandparents'
visitation right. Following Wickham, the father argued that the
visitation agreement should be terminated. Both the trial court and
appellate court found that Wickham did not nullify the parties' visitation
agreement. 7 1  The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that while the
Wickham decision rejected the trial court's judgment being substituted
for the judgment of the parents, here, the trial court had not substituted
its judgment for the father's. 72 The order entered by the court granting
visitation rights was considered a consent decree because it was based
upon the parties' agreement. 73 Here, the order was not imposed by the
court against the father's wishes; rather, it was entered pursuant to an
agreement between the parties. 74
One other recent challenge to a consent decree argued that there was
no consideration for the visitation agreement. In Felzak v. Hruby, the
parents challenged the enforcement of a consent decree after the
grandparent visitation statute was ruled unconstitutional.75 The parents
claimed that the grandmother provided consideration for the visitation
agreement by forbearing her claim to petition for custody under 607(b)
of the Act. Because section 607(b) was invalid, she had no legal claim
to forbear and thus provided no consideration for the agreement.76 The
court disagreed with this argument, finding that "any act or promise that
benefits one party or disadvantages another is sufficient consideration to
support the formation of a contract." 77
70. In Re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392 (IM. 2004).
71. Id. at 397-98.
72. Id. at 400.
73. See id. at 398-99.
74. Id.
75. Felzak v. Hruby, 855 N.E.2d 202 (Il1. App. Ct. 2006).
76. Id. at 220.
77. Id. at 221 (citing De Fontaine v. Passalino, 584 N.E.2d 933, 939 (I1. 1991)).
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C. Common Law
After Wickham, several courts issued conflicting opinions regarding
whether grandparents' visitation rights continued to exist at common
law. 78 In Felzak, the court determined that grandparent visitation cases
still present a justiciable issue under common law. 79 In In re Marriage
of Sullivan, the court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the
father's petition on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. 80 The father
had petitioned to allow his parents to visit with his children during his
absence while serving in the military. 81 The court held that the effect of
a finding that sections 607(b)(1) and (b)(3) were unconstitutional was to
return the law to its form before the enactment of the statute. 82
In Beurksen v. Graft,83 the trial court granted a mother's petition to
vacate a prior order granting visitation to the child's grandmother on the
basis that the grandparent visitation statute had been declared
unconstitutional. 84 The grandmother argued that the court should apply
common law principles to uphold the prior order. The First District
Appellate Court noted that despite the Third District's ruling in In Re
M.M.D.,85 (finding a common law right to petition for grandparent
visitation following Wickham) "the parties' visitation order is invalid as
it is based on an unconstitutional statute." 86
In In re Marriage of Ross,87 a mother filed a petition asking the court
to grant her parents visitation with her children. The Fifth District
Appellate Court refused to follow the ruling in Sullivan.88 The court
78. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 795 N.E.2d 392 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003); Beurksen v.
Graff, 813 N.E.2d 1018 (I. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004); Felzak v. Hruby, 855 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 2006); In re Marriage of Ross, 824 N.E. 2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2005).
79. Felzak, 855 N.E.2d at 215.
80. Sullivan, 795 N.E.2d at 394.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 396 (citing Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co, 122 N.E.2d
540, 543 (111. 1954)) ("The legal effect of declaring a statute unconstitutional is to relegate the
parties to such rights as obtained prior to the enactment of the unconstitutional statute."). In this
case, returning to the common law rights that existed prior to the enactment of the
unconstitutional statute would have allowed the father to petition for visitation between his
children and his parents. Id.
83. Beurksen v. Graff, 813 N.E. 2d 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
84. Id. at 1019 (vacating a previous visitation order between grandmother and grandson
following Wickham).
85. In re M.M.D., 800 N.E.2d 831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
86. See Beurksen, 813 N.E.2d at 1021 (agreeing with dissent of Justice Slater in In re M.M.D.,
and holding the visitation agreement void).
87. In re Marriage of Ross, 824 N.E.2d 1108 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2003).
88. See id. at 1116 (citing Wickham v. Byrne 769 N.E.2d 1, 8 (ill. 2002) ("We ... fail to
reconcile the court's distinction in In re Marriage of Sullivan with the Illinois Supreme Court's
declaration in Wickham that no set of circumstances existed under which the statute could validly
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instead ruled, "The statute authorizing the court to order grandparent
visitation privileges, against a parent's wishes, was declared
unconstitutional, and the prior common law that authorized the same is
equally unconstitutional.,
89
Notably, the majority of these courts did not analyze whether the
state would have a compelling interest in ordering visitation rights over
a parent's objection given the particular facts presented in the case, but
instead concluded that because visitation agreements infringe on the
parent's fundamental right to raise his child, visitation rights cannot be
legitimized by reliance on common law principles. These courts did not
consider situations where the state may have a compelling state interest
in granting visitation to nonparents over the objection of a parent who
had not been determined unfit. Even recognizing that parents have the
fundamental right to make child-rearing decisions, there may be times
that such an order would pass constitutional scrutiny.
Because the courts disagree about the survival and application of the
common law, and are not adequately analyzing whether a compelling
state interest exists under the facts of each case, there is a need for
statutes which establish the right to petition for custody, visitation, or
guardianship. These statutes should identify what must be shown to
establish whether the state has a compelling interest in protecting a
relationship between a child and a third party.
D. Amendments to the Grandparent Visitation Statute
After Wickham, the state adopted a new grandparent visitation
statute, which became effective in January of 2005.90 The statute
creates "a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's actions and
authorize a court to order grandparent visitation against a parent's wishes because that court-
ordered visitation would violate a parent's constitutionally protected liberty interest to direct the
care, custody, and control of his children without unwarranted state intrusion."). The Court also
noted:
The special circumstances for which the common law authorized the courts to order
grandparent visitation were similar to those circumstances delineated in the statute that
Wickham declared to be unconstitutional. We are inclined to agree with the First
District Appellate Court in Beurksen. In Beurksen, the court cited with approval
Justice Slater's appellate court dissent in In re M.M.D., which stated that court-ordered
grandparent visitation infringed upon the parent's fundamental right to raise his child
and could not be retroactively legitimized by reliance on resurrected common law
principles.
Id. (citations omitted) (discussing Beurksen, 813 N.E.2d 1018).
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2004 & West Supp. 2005), amended by Act of July 14, 2006,
Ill. Pub. Act 94-1026, sec. 5, 2006 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2645 (West) (for the amendments effective
Jan. 1, 2005, see Act of Aug. 12, 2004, Il1. Pub. Act 93-911, sec. 5, 2004 111. Laws 3212).
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decisions regarding grandparent . . . visitation are not harmful to the
child's mental, physical, or emotional health." 9 1 It places the burden on
the party filing the petition to prove that the parent's actions and
decisions regarding visitation times are harmful to the child's mental,
physical, or emotional health.92 Minor amendments were made to the
statute again in 2005, changing the term "illegitimate" to a child "born
out of wedlock."'93  More substantive changes were made to the
grandparent visitation statute in 2006; the amendments take effect in
January of 2007.94
91. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a-5)(3) (2004 & West Supp. 2005), amended by Act of July
14, 2006, l. Pub. Act 94-1026, sec. 5, 2006 111. Legis. Serv. 2645 (West).
92. Id.
93. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a-5)(3) (2004 & West Supp. 2005), amended by Act of July
14, 2006, 111. Pub. Act 94-1026, sec. 5, 2006 111. Legis. Serv. 2645 (West) (for the amendments
effective Jan. 1, 2006, see Act of July 14, 2005, 111. Pub. Act 94-229, sec. 15, 2005 111. Laws
2047).
94. Act of July 14, 2006, Ill. Pub. Act 94-1026, sec. 5, 2006 111. Legis. Serv. 2645, 2645-49
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607).
The substantive changes are as follows:
5/607(a-3) was amended to provide Grandparent, great-grandparents, and siblings of a
minor child, who is one year old or older, have standing to bring an action in circuit
court by petition, requesting visitation in accordance with this Section. The term
"sibling" in this Section means a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the minor
child. Grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings also have standing to file a
petition for visitation rights in a pending dissolution proceeding or any other
proceeding that involves custody or visitation issues, requesting visitation in
accordance with this Section. A petition for visitation with a child by a person other
than a parent must be filed in the county in which the child resides. Nothing in this
subsection (a-3) and subsection (a-5) of the this Section shall apply to a child whose
interests in a petition is pending under Section 2-13 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
or a petition to adopt an unrelated child is pending under the Adoption Act.
Section 5/607(a-5)(1)(A) was deleted. This provision had provided the following condition: "one
parent of the child is incompetent as a matter of law or deceased or has been sentenced to a period
of imprisonment for more than 1 year;"
Section 5/607(a-5)(1)(A-5) was added. "(A-5) the child's other parent is deceased or has been
missing for at least 3 months. For the purposes of this Section a parent is considered to be
missing if the parent's location has not been determined and the parent has been reported
as missing to a law enforcement agency;"
Section 5/607(a-5)(1)(A-10) was added. "(A-10) a parent of the child is incompetent as a
matter of law;"
Section 5/607(a-5)(1)(A-15) was added. "(A-15) a parent has been incarcerated in jail or
prison during the 3 month period preceding the filing of the petition;"
Section 5/607(a-5)(1)(B) was amended as follows: "the child's mother and father are divorced or
have been legally separated from each other or there is pending a dissolution proceeding
involving a parent of the child or another court proceeding involving custody or visitation of
the child (other than any adoption proceeding of an unrelated child) during the 3 mnt
period prior te the filing of the petition and at least one parent does not object to the grandparent,
great-grandparent, or sibling having visitation with the child. The visitation of the grandparent,
great-grandparent, or sibling must not diminish the visitation of the parent who is not related to
the grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling seeking visitation;"
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Most significantly, subsection (a-3) provides that:
Grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings of a minor child, who
is one year old or older, have standing to bring an action in circuit
court by petition, requesting visitation in accordance with this Section.
... Grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings also have standing
to file a petition for visitation rights in a pending dissolution
proceeding or any other proceeding that involves custody or visitation
issues, requesting visitation in accordance with this Section.95
It remains unclear whether grandparents have standing to bring a
petition for visitation when a child is less than one year old. When
looking at the other language in subsection (a-3), the language specifies
"this subsection (a-3)" when referencing the contents of this paragraph
(a-3). Therefore, the provision stating that grandparents may also have
standing to file a petition in accordance with this Section may mean that
grandparents would have standing to petition for visitation of a child
Section 5/607(a-5)(1)(C) was deleted.
Section 5/607(a-5)(2)(2) was amended as follows: "Any visitation rights granted pursuant to
this Section before the filing of a petition for adoption of a child shall automatically
terminate by operation of law upon the entry of an order terminating parental rights or
granting the adoption of the child, whichever is earlier. If the person or persons who
adopted the child are related to the child, as defined by Section 1 of the Adoption Act, any
person who was related to the child as grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling prior to
the adoption shall have standing to bring an action pursuant to this Section requesting
visitation with the child. The grandparent, groat grandpaFrnt, or sibling f a pa.ent whe
pafental ights hav'e been termifiated thrOUgh an adoption proceeding may noet petitionfi
Section 5/607(a-5)(4)(I) was amended as follows: "whether the petitioner had frequent or regular
contact or visitation with the child for at least 12 consecutive months; and"
Section 5/607(a-5)(4)(J) was amended, adding the word "and" at the end of the section.
Section 5/607(a-5)(4)(K) as added providing: "whether the grandparent, great-grandparent,
or sibling was a primary caretaker of the child for a period of not less than 6 consecutive
months."
Section 5/607(a-7)(2) was amended as follows: "The court shall not modify an
gF dpar nt, great ga.dparent, or sibling visitation order that grants visitation to a
grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence,
upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior visitation order or that were unknown to the
court at the time of the entry of the prior visitation, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his or her custodian, and that the modification is necessary to protect
the mental, physical, or emotional health of the child. The court shall state in its decision specific
findings of fact in support of its modification or termination of the grandparent, great-grandparent
or sibling visitation. A child's parent may always petition to modify visitation upon changed
circumstances when necessary to promote the child's best interest."
Section 5/607(c) was amended as follows: "The court may modify an order granting or denying
visitation rights of a parent whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child; but
the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would
endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health."
95. Act of July 14, 2006, I11. Pub. Act 94-1026, sec. 5, 2006 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2645, 2646
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 38
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren
less than one year if any of the other provisions in Section (a) are
applicable and there are other pending proceedings involving visitation
or custody of the child. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the
amendment is that a grandparent is prohibited from bringing a
grandparent visitation proceeding for a child less than one year old
unless there is a separate proceeding already pending concerning the
child's visitation or custody. The amendment could also be interpreted
to mean that grandparents cannot petition for visitation of any child who
is less than one year old.
IV. GUARDIANSHIP
In Illinois, under the Probate Act, there are three ways a nonparent
can obtain guardianship over a minor child: (1) through the traditional
guardianship process, 96 (2) through appointment as a short-term
guardian,97 or (3) through a standby guardianship. 98 A guardian over
the person "shall have the custody, nurture and tuition and shall provide
for the education of the ward." 99  The guardian of a minor's estate
"shall have the care, management and investment of the estate, shall
manage the estate frugally and shall apply the income and principal of
the estate so far as necessary for the comfort and suitable support and
education of the ward." 100
In a traditional guardianship case, "[t]he court lacks jurisdiction to
proceed on a petition for the appointment of a guardian of a minor if (i)
the minor has a living parent, adoptive parent or adjudicated parent,
whose parental rights have not been terminated, whose whereabouts are
known, and who is willing and able to make and carry out day-to-day
child care decisions concerning the minor." 10 1 The court may exercise
jurisdiction over a petition for guardianship if a parent consents to the
appointment of the guardian, or the parent fails to object to the
appointment of the guardian after receiving notice of the hearing.
10 2
Finally, if guardianship over a child has already been established by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the court may also exercise jurisdiction
96. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5 (2004). See also infra notes 101-105 and accompanying
text (discussing traditional guardianship under the Probate Act).
97. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5.4 (2004). See also infra Part IV.B (discussing the short-term
guardianship provisions under the Probate Act).
98. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5.3 (2004). See also infra Part IV.A (discussing the standby
guardianship provisions under the Probate Act).
99. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13(a) (2004).
100. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13(b) (2004).
101. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(b)(i) (2004).
102. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(b)(i) (2004).
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on a new petition for guardianship. 10 3 In guardianship cases, there is a
"rebuttable presumption that a parent of a minor is willing and able to
make and carry out day-to-day child care decisions concerning the
minor, but the presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence." 104 When determining whether guardianship is appropriate,
the court must consider the best interests of the child. 10 5
The Probate Act contains a specific pronouncement concerning
parental right to custody. It provides:
If both parents of a minor are living and are competent to transact their
own business and are fit persons, they are entitled to the custody of the
person of the minor and the direction of his education. If one parent is
dead and the surviving parent is competent to transact his own
business and is a fit person, he is similarly entitled. The parents have
equal powers, rights and duties concerning the minor. If the parents
live apart, the court for good reason may award the custody and
education of the minor to either parent or some other person. 106
Presumably, the matter would not proceed to a best-interests hearing
on a guardianship petition unless there is no fit parent available and
willing to make the day-to-day child-care decisions for the child. Also,
it seems clear that under current case law, before the court grants the
custody and education of the minor to a person other than the parent,
over a parent's objection, the court must determine that the state has a
compelling interest justifying this type of intervention into the
family. 107
A. Standby Guardians
In 1994, the state added provisions to the Probate Act relating to
standby guardians. 10 8  The provisions for standby guardians allow
parents or current guardians to designate someone to be appointed as the
standby guardian. That person will act as a guardian for the child when
the child's parents or guardian dies or is nor longer willing or able to
make day-to-day child-care decisions.10 9  The same presumptions
concerning the parents that apply in the traditional guardianship cases
103. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(b)(ii) (2004).
104. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(b)(ii) (2004).
105. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(a) (2004).
106. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (2004).
107. In Re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392, 399-401 (111. 2004); Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1, 6-
8 (Ill. 2002) ("State interference with fundamental parental childrearing rights is justified in
limited instances to protect the health, safety, and welfare of children.").
108. Act of July 14, 1994, 111. Pub. Act 88-529, sec. 5, 1993 Ill. Laws 4685, 4687 (codified as
amended 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5.3).
109. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5.3 (2004),
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apply in standby guardianships. 110 The standby guardian does not have
authority to act until he or she receives knowledge of the death or
inability of the minor's parent, parents, or guardian to make and carry
out the day-to-day child-care decisions for the child, or until he or she
receives the consent of the parent(s) or guardian.111 Within sixty days
after receiving this knowledge, the standby guardian must petition for
the traditional guardianship of minors under the Probate Act.1 12
B. Short-Term Guardianship
The short-term guardianship provisions were added to the Probate
Act in 1994.113 This section allows parents or guardians to appoint, in
writing and without court approval, a short-term guardian to act as
guardian of the person of a minor child for up to sixty days. 114 The
short-term guardian does not have estate guardianship powers, except
that a short-term guardian may apply for public benefits on behalf of the
minor child.1 15 A parent may not appoint a short-term guardian if the
minor has another living parent "whose parental rights have not been
terminated, whose whereabouts are known, and who is willing and able
to make and carry out day-to-day child-care decisions concerning the
minor, unless the [other] parent consents to the appointment by signing
the written instrument" appointing the short-term guardian.
116
C. In re R.L.S.
In February 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court, in In re R.L.S., 1
17
compared the standing requirements for guardianship under the Probate
Act to those for custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. In this case, the trial court had dismissed a petition for
guardianship filed by a child's grandparents based upon the child's
father's claim that the grandparents lacked standing because the child's
father had not voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody of the
child.118 The minor child had resided with her grandmother at the time
110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the rebuttable presumption that
parent is willing and able to make day-to-day decisions).
111. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13.1(b) (2004).
112. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13.1(c) (2004).
113. Act of Jan. 14, 1994, 111. Pub. Act 88-529, sec. 5, 1993 Ill. Laws 4685, 4687 (codified as
amended 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5.4).
114. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13.2(a) (2004).
115. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13.2(b) (2004).
116. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5.4(b) (2004).
117. 844 N.E.2d 22 (111. 2006).
118. In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22, 25-26 (l. 2006).
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the child's mother died in an automobile accident. 119 Following the
child's mother's death the grandparents petitioned for guardianship over
the child.120 The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that section 11-5(b) provides the only requirement for standing
for guardianship petitioners. 12 1 It does not include a requirement that a
parent voluntarily and indefinitely relinquish custody of a child before
someone can petition for guardianship. The appellate court found that
the state can carry out the superior-rights doctrine in different ways
when effectuated in different acts. 122  The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed that each statute has its own standing requirements, stating that,
"to have standing to seek custody under the Marriage Act, the nonparent
must first show that the child is not in the physical custody of one of his
parents."123
In contrast, "to have standing to proceed on a petition for
guardianship under the Probate Act, when the minor has a parent whose
whereabouts are known, the petitioner must rebut the statutory
presumption that the parent is 'willing and able to make and carry out
day-to-day child care decisions concerning the minor."' 124 In R.L.S.,
the child's father urged that "unless guardianship petitioners under the
Probate Act are required to show that the child is not in the physical
custody of one of his parents, the Probate Act violates the parents' due
process rights." 125  Moreover, he argued, similar to the Washington
statute invalidated in Troxel allowing "any person" to petition for
visitation at "any time," "the Probate Act allows any qualified nonfelon
adult to commence a guardianship proceeding simply by filing apetition."126 Although the Supreme Court agreed that the Probate Act
establishes minimum limits on those who may file a petition for
guardianship, the court disagreed that the Act contained the same
infirmity identified by the Supreme Court in Troxel. 127  The court
distinguished the Probate Act from the statute struck down in Troxel,
stating:
119. Id. at25.
120. Id.
121. Id. at26.
122. In re R.L.S., 820 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). The appellate court held that
"how the superior rights doctrine is effectuated in one act is irrelevant to application of the same
doctrine in another." Id.
123. In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d at 27.
124. Id. at 28 (quoting 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-5(b) (West 2004)).
125. Id. at 28.
126. Id. at 30 (citations omitted).
127. Id.
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren
A person who petitioned for visitation under the Washington statute
would be given a hearing on merits, and the determination of the
child's best interests would be made without any deference to the
parents' decision. By contrast, a person who files a petition for
guardianship under the Probate Act will have the petition dismissed if
the child has a parent who is willing and able to carry out day-to-day
child-care decisions." 128
The court acknowledged that a petitioner can proceed on the merits
of a petition over the objection of a parent when the parent has been
found to be unwilling or unable to carry out day-to-day child-care
decisions, thus insuring both the protection of children's health, safety
and welfare as well as the superior rights of parents. 129
The Illinois Supreme Court discusses section 11-7 of the Probate Act
in great detail in In re R.L.S. The last sentence of that section provides,
"If the parents live apart, the court for good reason may award the
custody and education of the minor to either parent or to some other
person." 130 The court interpreted this sentence, when taken in context
with the other sentences in the section, to mean that fit parents are
entitled to custody of their children. 131 If the parents live apart, "the
court may award the child to either parent if both are fit." 132 The court
noted that prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions had historically
refused to apply section 11-7 in this manner. 133 "Instead, this court has
repeatedly held that, despite the statute's pronouncement, a fit parent's
custody rights are subservient to the best interests of the child. ' 134 The
Supreme Court concluded that its prior decisions that did not apply
section 11-7 as written were wrong and should no longer be
followed. 135 The court held that the petitioners lacked standing to
proceed with their petition, "unless the court determines that they have
rebutted the presumption that respondent is willing and able to make
day-to-day child-care decisions. Moreover, if respondent is a fit person
128. Id. at 30.
129. InreR.L.S., 844N.E.2dat3l.
130. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (2004).
131. In re R.LS., 844 N.E.2d at 32 ("If the child does not have a fit parent, good reason exists
to award the child to a third party.").
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 331-32 (Il1. 1995); In re Estate of
Whittington, 483 N.E.2d 210, 215 (Ill. 1985); In re Custody of Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231,
1234 (Ill. 1981); People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 247 N.E.2d 417,421-22 (Ill. 1969)).
135. In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d at 34.
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who is competent to transact his own business, he is entitled to custody
of R.L.S." 136
The Illinois Supreme Court did not address the qualifications of a "fit
person," nor does the Probate Act define a "fit person." "A fit person
who is competent to transact his own business" may not be someone
who has previously demonstrated a willingness and ability to make day-
to-day child-care decisions, nor must the "person who is competent to
transact his own business" necessarily be competent to care for his
child. Hopefully, courts will allow petitioners to rebut the presumption
that the respondent is willing and able to make day-to-day child-care
decisions by showing that the parent has never, or rarely, demonstrated
a willingness or ability to make day-to-day child-care decisions for the
child. A parent's claim of willingness and ability to make these
decisions will hopefully also be insufficient to deny a guardianship
petitioner standing when the parent has been absent from the child's life
for a significant period of time or when the parent has not fulfilled the
responsibilities of parenting. The person who has fulfilled the
responsibilities of parenting for a significant period of time should have
standing to bring a guardianship petition.
D. Custody
The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act authorizes a
grandparent or others to petition for custody of a child. 137 The custody
provision provides that a child-custody petition can be filed by a person
other than a parent, but only if the child is not in the physical custody of
one of his parents. 13 8 This statute also allows grandparents to petition
for custody of a child when one of the parents is deceased, provided that
certain circumstances concerning the surviving parent exist. 139
136. Id.
137. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b) (2004).
138. Id. at5/601(b)(2).
139. Id. at 5/601(b)(4)(A)-(C). Grandparents may petition for custody of a child when one or
more of the following circumstances exists at the time of the parent's death:
(A) the surviving parent had been absent from the marital abode for more than one
month without the deceased spouse knowing his or her whereabouts;
(B) the surviving parent was in State or federal custody; or
(C) the surviving parent had: (i) received supervision for or been convicted of any
violation of Article 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 directed towards the deceased
parent or the child; or (ii) received supervision or been convicted of violating an order
of protection entered under Section 217, 218, or 219 of the Illinois Domestic Violence
Act of 1986 for the protection of the deceased parent or child.
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren
Shortly after In re R.L.S. was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court,
the Fifth District Appellate Court confronted the question whether the
decision in R.L.S. "expressly abrogated all previous cases that adhered
to the rule that the superior rights of fit natural parents were necessarily
subservient to the best interests of the child." 140 The appellant also
asked the court to find that unless a parent is unfit, the court should not
make decisions concerning the best interest of the child when a petition
for custody has been filed by someone other than the parent. In In re
Custody of T.W., the grandparents of a minor child filed a petition for
custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
14 1
The mother of the child had voluntarily surrendered physical custody of
the child to her parents, the child's grandparents, and the minor child
had not been in the physical custody of either of her parents for more
than two years. 142 The child had lived in her grandparents' home
during the first year and half of her life. 14 3 When the child was two, she
moved to another residence with her mother for about one year, but then
returned to live with her grandparents. She resided with them until the
time of the grandparents' custody petition, when the minor was almost
six years old.144 The father had not acknowledged paternity until the
Illinois Attorney General instituted an action to obtain child support. 145
The father had visited with the child regularly for part of one day on
alternate weekends for a period of two years. 146 The father had recently
married and purchased a new home with three bedrooms. 147 The trial
court found that the grandparents had met their burden of showing good
cause to overcome the superior rights of the respondent. 148 The father
appealed the trial court's decision, relying on In re R.L.S. 149
The Fifth District appellate court rejected the father's argument,
determining that in In re R.L.S. the Illinois Supreme Court had only
criticized the precedent regarding the operation of the Probate Act and
that this interpretation did not apply in cases under the Marriage Act.
150
140. In re Custody of T.W., A Minor, 851 N.E.2d 881,888 (l. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2006).
141. Id. at 882.
142. Id. at 883.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 888.
146. Id. at 883.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 890.
149. Id. at 888.
150. The court found the limitation in R.L.S. "exceptionally clear when viewed in light of
other recent statement regarding the operation of the superior-rights doctrine." It stated, "the
precedents criticized in R.L.S. have recently been used to address the Juvenile Court Act of
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Shortly before In Re R.L.S. was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court
cited People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston for the proposition that
"[u]nder certain circumstances 'it is not necessary that the natural parent
be found unfit or be found to have legally forfeited his rights to custody,
if it is in the best interest of the child that he be placed in the custody of
someone other than the natural parent."' 151  The Fifth District
concluded, "In re R.L.S. 's limitation to the Probate Act explains why the
court saw no need to address this recent Juvenile Court Act precedent."
The Fifth District also noted that "[s]ubsequent to In re R.L.S., the
Fourth District Appellate Court stated that under the Juvenile Court Act
a court need not find a natural parent unfit before awarding custody to
another person, but the court must follow the procedural requirements
of the Juvenile Court Act." 15 2
Pre- and post-Wickham, many cases have presented issues in the
appellate courts regarding the application of the standing requirements
in custody cases filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. 153  Recently, the Fifth District found that whether a
nonparent has the custody of the minor child, so as to have standing to
seek the custody of a minor child, is determined by examining the
nonparent's status on the date relief is sought. 154 The court stated:
[I]n concluding that a nonparent has the physical custody of a minor
child, the circuit court must consider factors such as who was
responsible for the child's care and welfare prior to the initiation of
custody proceedings, how the physical possession of the child was
obtained, and the nature and duration of the possession of the child.
155
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS-SETTING THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Following Troxel, many cases have been decided throughout the
United States concerning the constitutionality of grandparent visitation
statutes.156 The debate over grandparents' rights to visitation, custody,
1987." Id. at 889 (citations omitted).
151. Id. (citing In re Austin W., 823 N.E.2d 572, 584 (2005)).
152. In re Custody of T.W, A Minor, 851 N.E.2d at 889 (citing In re SJ., 846 N.E.2d 633, 641
(Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2006) and 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-28 (West 2004)).
153. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601 (2004).
154. In re Marriage of Archibald, 843 N.E. 2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2006).
155. Id.
156. For a comprehensive review of these cases, see Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court
Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the Courts' Reluctance to Declare Grandparent
Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 14, 22-29 (2003); Karl A. Menniger,
Grandparent Visitation and Custody Awards, 69 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 281 (2004);
Michael K. Goldberg, Over the River and Through the Woods-Again: The New Illinois
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or guardianship over grandchildren has centered on whether
establishing this type of legal relationship between the grandparent and
grandchild infringes on the parent's fundamental right to parent his own
child. The struggle to determine whether and to what degree the state
should be involved in cases involving parties seeking the right to parent
or to preserve some form of relationship with a child is reflected in the
volume of cases that have been litigated. Some courts, like the Supreme
Court of Illinois, have declared their state's statutes unconstitutional, 157
while other state supreme courts have upheld the constitutionality of
grandparent visitation statutes. 158  Visitation statutes that have
withstood constitutional scrutiny do not contain special language;
instead, courts recognized that the statutes could be applied in a
constitutional manner.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut recognized that to invalidate
Connecticut's statute on its face "would leave adrift the significant
interests of the children harmed by the loss of visitation with a loved
one." 159 Other courts, like the Kansas Supreme Court, the Mississippi
Supreme Court, and the Maine Supreme Court, found that their statutes
could be applied in a constitutional manner if proper consideration is
given to the parent's liberty interest. 160
After ruling Illinois' grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional in
Wickham, the Illinois Supreme Court was again confronted with a
constitutional challenge to an Illinois statute involving parental rights.
In the 2004 case of In re Parentage of John M., a Minor,16 1 a trial court
ruled that the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984162 was unconstitutional.
163
However, the trial court's reasoning was unclear. In reviewing the trial
court's decision, the Supreme Court discussed the factors involved in a
traditional analysis associated with due process and equal protection
claims. 164
Grandparent Visitation Act, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 403, 422-32 (2005).
157. Roberts, supra note 156, at 23-29; Goldberg, supra note 156, at 422-32.
158. Goldberg, supra note 156, at 422-32.
159. Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431,449 (Conn. 2002) (emphasis omitted).
160. Id.; Rideout v. Riendea, 761 A.2d 291, 298 (Me. 2000); Skov v. Wicker, 32 P.3d 1122,
1123 (Kan. 2001); Stacy v. Ross, 798 So. 2d 1275, 1279 (Miss. 2001); Zeman v. Stanford, 789
So. 2d 798, 803 (Miss. 2001).
161. In re Parentage of John M., a Minor, 817 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. 2004).
162. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 et seq. (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
163. In re John M., 817 N.E.2d at 503-04.
164. Id. at 507-08. Specifically, the court said:
This court noted in In re R.C. that there are general procedures that courts follow when
addressing due process challenges: "The analysis courts use when confronted with a
claim that a statute violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Illinois
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The Supreme Court noted at the outset that:
A facial challenge of the constitutionality of a statute is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully. This is because a statute is
facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exist under which the
Act would be valid. The fact that the statute could be found
unconstitutional under some set of circumstances does not establish
the facial invalidity of the statute. 1
65
The question that follows this decision is whether the Illinois
Supreme Court followed this standard when it ruled the grandparent
visitation statute unconstitutional in Wickham. Did the court
contemplate other sets of circumstances where the statute could have
been applied in a constitutional manner? Could the state have granted
grandparents or others visitation rights under the statute without
violating the protections provided by the United States and Illinois
Constitutions? Wickham did not discuss this type of analysis.
There are several examples of how former section 607(b)(1) of the
visitation statute could be applied in a constitutional manner. First,
when the parents of a child disagree on grandparent visitation, the court
could exercise jurisdiction under the prior version of 607(b)(1) to
determine a grandparent's petition for visitation without violating the
parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the child. The
fundamental right to make decisions regarding a child does not preclude
the court from deciding matters concerning a child in cases where the
parents disagree. Some court mechanism must be available for these
decisions when the parents do not agree. One parent simply cannot
claim the shield of "the fundamental right" to make decisions
Constitutions depends on the nature of the right upon which the statute supposedly
infringes. Ordinarily courts will employ a relaxed scrutiny of statutes, looking only to
see whether the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
However, in cases where the right infringed upon is among those considered a
'fundamental' constitutional right, courts subject the statute to 'strict' scrutiny. To
survive strict scrutiny, the means employed by the legislature must be 'necessary' to a
'compelling' state interest, and the statute must be narrowly tailored thereto, i.e., the
legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its
goal." Similarly, there are analytical procedures which are typically followed when an
equal protection challenge is made. In City of Urbana v. Andrew N. B. we explained:
"Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated
similarly, unless the government demonstrates an appropriate reason for doing
otherwise. The shorthand we have developed for the degree of deference we give in
evaluating the appropriateness of such a reason is the term 'scrutiny.' In cases like the
one before us, where the statutory classification at issue does not involve fundamental
rights, we employ so-called rational basis scrutiny and ask only whether the challenged
classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate purpose." Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
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concerning the child to prevent court intervention when the parents are
in disagreement concerning the child's upbringing.
Second, section 607(b)(1) of the former grandparent visitation statute
could have been applied in a constitutional manner where the
grandparent had been the primary caregiver for the grandchild for a
substantial period of time. Even though the parents may not have been
ruled unfit, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
relationship between the child and grandparent because harm may have
come to the child absent the state's intervention. As indicated, the state
is not precluded from intervening in that parent's fundamental right to
parent when the state has a compelling state interest to do so. 166
Finally, section 607(b)(1) could be applied in a constitutional manner
when the biological parent of the child has not fulfilled his or her
parental responsibilities. When a parent fails to demonstrate a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by participating in the
rearing of a child, his or her interest in personal contact with the child
may not require substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. 167
A. Compelling State Interest
When does the state have a compelling interest in allowing a person
who is not the child's biological parent to petition the court for
visitation, custody, or guardianship? Is the biological relationship
between a parent and child sufficient to warrant protection when the
parent has not established any other type of relationship with the child,
i.e., when the parent has not been involved in parenting?
The United States Supreme Court has found that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting both biological and nonbiological
family relationships. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,168 the Court
determined that a mere biological relationship is not enough to establish
the fundamental right to parent a child. Further, the Court found that
even a biological relationship coupled with an established relationship
with the child might be insufficient to establish the fundamental right to
parent a child. 169 In Michael H., the biological father of a child sought
to overturn a California statute that created the presumption of paternity
for the husband when a child was born during the marriage. 170 As one
commentator has summarized the court's finding:
166. See infra Part V.A (discussing compelling state interests).
167. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (discussing parental responsibilities).
168. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
169. Id. at 126-27.
170. Id. at 113.
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That the liberty interest, or due process protection of the family,
trumped the interests of the biological father in maintaining a
relationship with his child. Specifically, the right of the family to
avoid rupture in these circumstances is a constitutionally protected
right pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 17 1
When a biological parent has not been involved in rearing a child, the
biological parent is not part of a family unit that warrants the right to
avoid rupture. The United States Supreme Court unambiguously stated
in Lehr v. Robertson1 72 that a mere biological relationship is not enough
to warrant substantial protection under the Due Process Clause when a
biological parent has not demonstrated a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood. The Court noted that if the natural father
fails to grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child,
"the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen
to his opinion of where the child's best interest lie." 173 In Lehr, the
Court emphasized the familial relationship that results from the
emotional attachments established by the intimacy of daily association,
and the manner in which the familial relationship plays an important
role in promoting a constructive way of life through the instruction of
the child. The Court recognized that parents obtain rights as a
counterpart to the responsibilities they have assumed. 174
These cases leave little doubt that when grandparents have fulfilled
the responsibilities of parenting, and the parent has not demonstrated a
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenting, the biological
parent's opinion concerning the child's best interests is unpersuasive.
Instead, the state must protect the substantial relationships that have
formed, and the family unit that has developed, while a grandparent has
been fulfilling the role of parent. Illinois statutes do not clearly state
this principle.
VI. ADOPTING A UNIFORM STANDING REQUIREMENT
The current child custody standing provisions of the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act and the Probate Act should be revised
to enumerate factors to be considered when determining whether a
parent has acquiesced to another person's custody of a child. The
171. See Steven N. Peskind, Who's Your Daddy? An Analysis of Illinois' Law of Parentage
and the Meaning of Parenthood, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 811, 825-26 (2004) (discussing the
arguments against linking parentage and parentage rights with biology).
172. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
173. Id. at 248.
174. Id. at 257.
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current language in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act which states that a petition may be filed by someone other than a
parent "only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his
parents"'175 is insufficient. The state should consider adding factors
similar to those in the visitation provisions of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act. Specifically, courts should consider the
period of time that the grandparent has fulfilled parenting
responsibilities; whether the parent has provided consistent care for the
child; whether the parent has absented himself from the child's home,
making care from another child care provider necessary; and whether
the parent, impaired by substance abuse, has been unavailable to care
for the child in an appropriate manner. If the court finds that a parent
has not fulfilled the responsibilities of parentage, a grandparent should
have standing to petition for custody. The court could then determine
the best interests of the child when making the custody determination.
As currently interpreted, the Probate Act arguably requires that the
parent(s) must be found unfit (if the parents object to the guardianship)
before a grandparent can petition for guardianship. 176  "A fit person
who is competent to transact his own business" may not be someone
who has previously demonstrated a willingness and ability to make day-
to-day child-care decisions, nor may the "person who is competent to
transact his own business" necessarily be competent to care for his
child. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Probate Act
demonstrates that the statute must be amended to create clearer rules
regarding the petitioner's standing. The state should acknowledge that
there are factual situations that would warrant a court's determination of
a guardianship petition even when the parent has not been found unfit.
The person who has fulfilled the responsibilities of parenting for a
significant period of time should have standing to bring a guardianship
petition.
When reviewing changes to the Probate Act, the legislature should
also consider that the term "unfit" has traditionally been used in cases
involving termination of parental rights. 177 There are often times when
termination of parenting authority may not be at issue in determining
another party's right to involvement with the child. Often grandparents
provide care for their grandchildren with the hope that the parent will
someday assume their parental responsibilities. 178 Because "unfitness"
175. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601 (West 2006).
176. See supra Part IV.C (discussing parental rights to custody).
177. Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1 et. seq. (West 2006).
178. Most of the grandparents that the author has represented have expressed this desire.
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is a term associated with the termination of parental rights, the
possibility of a finding of unfitness may cause a parent to object to a
guardianship petition when the parent might otherwise acknowledge
that he or she is presently not able to care for the child. Standing
requirements to petition for guardianship under the Probate Act should
be similar to those proposed within the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act.1
79
The grandparent visitation statute that took effect in January 2007 is
tailored too narrowly. There are circumstances where the state has a
compelling interest in protecting a grandparent-grandchild relationship
that would be excluded under this statute. Under the present statute,
there is a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's actions and decisions
regarding grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling visitation are not
harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health. The
burden is on the party filing a petition under this section to prove that
the parent's actions and decisions regarding visitation times are harmful
to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health. Apparently, the
current statute presumes that the state would only have a compelling
interest in allowing grandparent visitation over a parent's objection
when the objection causes harm to the child. The state might have a
compelling interest in allowing grandparents visitation rights even
without a showing of harm to the child. If one parent consents to the
grandparent visitation, the petitioner should not be compelled to show
harm to the child before the court can award grandparent visitation
rights. It should not be necessary for a petitioner for grandparent
visitation to show harm to the child when no fundamental parental right
is at stake. If the parent has not demonstrated a commitment to
parenting the child, grandparent visitation rights could be granted
without concern for the fundamental right to make parenting decisions,
because the parent has not developed a relationship that merits
fundamental protection.
Finally, the grandparent visitation provisions that took effect in 2007
may prohibit a grandparent from petitioning for visitation simply
because the child is less than one year old. If the grandparent has
provided significant care of the child during the first twelve months of
the child's life, the grandparent should be allowed to petition for
visitation. If one parent consents to grandparent visitation, the
grandparent should be allowed to petition for visitation. It is not
179. See supra Part II.A (explaining the standing requirements under the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act).
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presently clear whether that grandparent would have standing to petition
under the January 2007 grandparent visitation statute.
VH. CONCLUSION
The confusion over whether and when it is appropriate for
grandparents to have standing to petition for guardianship, custody, or
visitation is evidenced by the numerous cases that have been brought
before the courts concerning these issues and the conflicting opinions
that have been issued by the courts. In addition to considering factual
circumstances, courts must balance whether the state has a duty to
intervene in the parent-child relationship for the protection of the child
or to promote a compelling state interest against the claim that a
parent's fundamental right to make decisions for his child is at stake.
Presently, Illinois statutes are ambiguous or, at a minimum, unclearly
interpreted. These issues merit the attention of the Illinois legislature.
Finally, the legislature should also focus on the significant problem
caused by grandparents' lack of financial resources for obtaining legal
representation. Without financial means, many grandparents are unable
to obtain the legal authority to provide the care that they already
provide. Grandparents are often unaware that they need to affirmatively
seek legal authority from the court to secure their right to make
decisions for their grandchildren. Some grandparents have raised their
grandchildren until adulthood without ever having obtained legal
authority to make decisions. Clearly the state has a strong interest in
promoting the continuity of care for children and in granting providers
of continued care a right to protect the relationships that have developed
between the caregiver and child.
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